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Abstract As defined in Horn 1969, JonlyK(p) presupposes p. von Fintel & Iatridou
(2007) note, however, that JonlyK(p) may presuppose that p is possible, rather
than necessary, and propose revising the analysis of only to weaken its contribution.
Building on Ippolito 2007, we show that this revision predicts interpretations which
are too weak in data involving plurals and negation. A paradox thus arises: Horn’s
only is too strong in some cases, but required in others. To resolve the paradox,
we maintain Horn’s only, but introduce an external source of weakening that is not
always available: in von Fintel and Iatridou’s modal environment, the argument of
only is weakened by a covert operator (AT LEAST, Crnic˘ 2011; Schwarz 2004) that
is blocked in the problematic cases involving plurals and negation.
Keywords: Only, sufficiency modal construction, AT LEAST, grammatical weakening
1 Introduction
As defined in Horn 1969, only applies to a proposition p (its ‘prejacent’), presupposes
that p is true, and asserts that all alternatives not entailed by p are false:
(1) JonlyKALT(p) = λw : p(w).∀p′ ∈ ALT [p′(w)→ p⊆ p′]
This paper is concerned with the presupposition of only. In basic data such as (2a), a
prejacent presupposition is supported: (2a) conveys that you visited the North End,
which is the prejacent of only, given the LF in (2b).
(2) a. You only visited the North End.
b. [TP only [vP you visited [the North End]F ]]
Yet, in some cases, the prejacent presupposition seems too strong. Consider the
configuration in (3), due to von Fintel & Iatridou (2007) (hence vF&I).
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(3) To get good cheese, you only have to go to the North End.
With the LF in (4) and only analyzed as in (1), (3) should presuppose a necessity
claim: that you have to go to the North End for good cheese. Yet, that is not intuited.
Rather, (3) has a ‘minimal sufficiency’ reading where it says that the North End is
one easy place to get good cheese. At its core, that is a possibility claim: that you
can got to the North End for good cheese.
(4) [TP only [vP2 have to [vP1 you go to [the North End]F ]]]
How does necessity weaken to possibility under only? vF&I revise the analysis
of only itself (Section 2). First, they modify its presupposition: instead of triggering
the ‘strong’ prejacent presupposition in (1), only carries just a ‘weak’ existential
presupposition (in effect, that some alternative is true). Second, they propose a
syntactic decomposition of only so that the presupposition is triggered by a covert
head taking low scope under the modal in (3).
We build a case to maintain the analysis of only in (1), despite the apparent
problem. Based on Ippolito 2007, we show that a weak existential presupposition for
only results in readings which are too weak in data involving plurals and negation
(Section 4). Moreover, only exhibits different properties from baseline constructions
with an overt decompositional syntax (Section 3).
If only is strong, weakening in (4) must come from another source. We propose
that natural language makes available a covert operator—AT LEAST (Crnic˘ 2011)—
which can be inserted into only’s scope (Section 5). In (4), AT LEAST results in the
prejacent of only being weaker than it appears from the surface string. As we will
see, the revised prejacent is viably presupposed. Because the source of weakening is
separate from only, there is no expectation that weakening should be detected in all
environments where only appears. In Section 6, we suggest that weak readings track
the distribution of AT LEAST, which is blocked on pragmatic grounds in the plural
and negation data from Section 4.
An extensive body of recent work has argued for a covert operator, EXH, which
has a meaning similar to only and thus strengthens its prejacent by introducing an
extra exhaustive entailment (e.g. Chierchia, Fox & Spector 2012). If our reasoning
is successful, a covert weakening operator exists, as well.
2 Prior analysis: Revising only
We begin by presenting vF&I’s revision to only. First, they decompose only into two
morphemes: sentential negation and an exceptive. The basic example in (2a) has the
LF in (5). NEG occurs at the site of overt only, while EXC is covert. EXC composes
with the focused DP to create a quantifier, which scopes below negation.
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(5) [TP NEG [vP [EXC [the North End]F ] λ1 [you visited t1]]]
The EXC head is responsible for presupposition triggering. Given the lexical entry
in (6), EXC triggers an existential presupposition: in (5), that you visit somewhere.
For illustration, we assume just three alternative locations (the North End, New
York, and Switzerland), abbreviate the proposition that you visited place x as φx, and
represent existential claims with equivalent disjunctions. The presupposition, then,
may be stated as (7), and that projects globally, over negation.
(6) JEXCK = λxe.λ f〈e,st〉.λw : ∃y[ f (y)(w)].∃z[z 6= x∧ f (z)(w)]
(7) P: φNE ∨ φNY ∨ φS
With respect to assertion, EXCP also makes an existential claim: that you visited
somewhere other than the North End. Negation operates on that proposition to derive
the exhaustive inference in (8)—that you did not visit anywhere else. For (2a), (7)
and (8) together yield the same inferences that the strong only in (1) would.
(8) A: ¬(φNY ∨φS)
A crucial difference arises in vF&I’s example, for which they propose the LF in
(9), where NEG and EXC take different scope relative to the modal.
(9) [TP NEG [vP2 have to [vP1 [EXC [the North End]F ] λ1 [you go to t1]]]]
EXC is below have, and triggers the same presupposition as in (7) above. Assuming
the presupposition projects universally through the modal and over negation, the
global presupposition is (10): that in each cheese-world, you go somewhere.
(10) P: (φNE ∨φNY ∨φS)
The presupposition is compatible with the intuited weak possibility inference—and,
indeed, that very inference derives in combination with the assertion. vP1 asserts that
you go somewhere other than the North End, and the modal and negation integrate
to derive (11): that you do not have to go anywhere other than the North End.
Combined together, (10) and (11) entail that there are some cheese-worlds where
you go to the North End (and nowhere else), not that in all cheese worlds you go to
the North End. By triggering a weak existential presupposition at a low scope site,
the necessity inference is weakened to possibility.
(11) A: ¬(φNY ∨φS)
In sum, vF&I proposal has two ingredients: (a) only is decomposed, and (b) it
gives rise to a weak existential presupposition. We raise challenges for both.
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3 Evidence against decomposition
To assess the viability of decomposing only into negation and an exceptive, we will
draw upon Spanish. Spanish has an adverbial solo which seems to parallel only. In
addition, Spanish (like other languages that vF&I survey) makes use of an exclusive
construction which wears on its sleeve a negation-exceptive structure: no + más que
XP. No is sentential negation, and vF&I characterize más que (lit. ‘more than’) as an
exceptive. vF&I’s core example is given with no más que in (12).
(12) Para
to
conseguir
get
buen
good
queso,
cheese,
no
not
tienes
have:2s
más
more
que
than
ir
go:INF
al
to-the
NE.
NE
By comparing solo and no más que, we will argue that the former is not in fact
reducible to the latter. In particular, we show that while no más que exhibits
characteristic properties of sentential negation, solo does not. This calls into question
the idea that solo contains sentential negation as part of its analysis.
We focus here on licensing of strong NPIs. Just like its English counterpart
(Klima 1964), temporal hasta in combination with telic event descriptions requires
negation in order to be licensed (Bosque 1980). As seen in (13), the sentential
negation in no más que licenses hasta. In contrast, solo in (14) does not.1 If solo
were decomposed to include sentential negation, it should pattern like no and no
más que and license hasta, contrary to fact.
(13) Juan
Juan
*(no)
not
apareció
showed-up:3s
hasta
until
las
the
nueve
nine
más
more
que
than
una
one
vez.
time
‘Juan only showed up at nine once.’
(14) *Juan
Juan
(solo)
only
apareció
showed-up:3s
(solo)
only
hasta
until
las
the
nueve
nine
una
one
vez.
time
We can make the same point with negative indefinites (‘n-words’, Laka 1990).
Spanish is a ‘non-strict’ negative concord language (Giannakidou & Zeijlstra 2017).
As such, in post-verbal position, negative indefinites are only licensed with c-
commanding negation, as in (15) (or with a c-commanding negative indefinite).
(15) Juan
Juan
*(no)
not
visitó
visited:3s
ningún
N-one
barrio
neighbourhood
con
con
María.
María
‘Juan didn’t visit any neighbourhood with María.’
In example (16), no más que exhibits the same licensing behavior as sentential
negation on its own. Solo, however, fails to license n-words, as (17) illustrates.
1 Parallel facts obtain with tampoco (‘either’) or postnominal alguno (‘any’) (Cepeda 2015).
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Again, the divergent behavior of solo is surprising, if solo includes negation as part
of its underlying representation.
(16) J.
J
*(no)
not
visitó
visited:3s
ningún
N-one
barrio
neighborhood
(con
(with
nadie)
N-body)
más
more
que
than
con
with
M.
M
‘J didn’t visit any neighbourhood with anybody other than with M.’
(17) *Juan
Juan
(solo)
only
visitó
visited:3s
(solo)
only
ningún
N-one
barrio
neighborhood
con
with
María.
María
To maintain a decompositional analysis of solo, an extra caveat would have to
be introduced such that the negation contributed by solo differs from overt no in its
ability to license strong NPIs and n-words. Yet, there is evidence that negation in
Spanish is a valid licenser, at least for n-words, regardless of how it is phonologically
realized. Consider (18), where an n-word occurs in subject position.
(18) Ningún
No
estudiante
student
visitó
visited:3s
ningún
N-one
barrio
neighbourhood
con
con
María.
María
‘No student visited any neighbourhood with María.’
Although there is no overt negation, a prominent line of research proposes that
preverbal n-word subjects are licensed by a covert negation (see Zeijlstra 2016 for
an overview). The object in (18) is another n-word, again licensed by the covert
negation. The negation that solo introduced, then, would have to differ from both
overt negation and from the covert negation in (18).
If solo is not decomposed, the data fall into place. Strong NPIs and n-words are
systematically licensed with a c-commanding negation morpheme, regardless of its
phonological realization, and no such morpheme is present with solo. On this basis,
we conclude in favor of a simplex adverbial analysis.
4 Too weak readings
We now evaluate the second piece of vF&I’s proposal: weakening the presupposition
of only to existential. Building on Ippolito 2007, we discuss three cases where this
move results in interpretations that are weaker than attested.
4.1 Associating with conjunction (plurals)
The first case is (19), where only associates with a conjunction. The intuitive
inferences are that John visited the North End and New York, as in (20a), and
nowhere else, as in (20b) (where φx here abbreviates ‘that John visited x.’)
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(19) John only visited [the North End and New York]F
(20) a. φNE ∧φNY b. ¬φS
If only receives the original strong analysis, both inferences are straightforwardly
captured, with (20a) deriving from the prejacent presupposition. Concretely, suppose
(19) were assigned the LF in (21).
(21) [TP onlystrong [vP [D [the North End and New York]] λ1 [John visited t1]]]
We assume that and is interpreted as the sum formation operator in (22). As defined
in Link 1983, andsum takes two referential DPs and outputs the mereological sum of
their referents, i.e. the sum of the North End and New York in (21).
(22) JandsumK = λxe.λye.x⊕ y
A covert distributive operator, D, takes the sum provided by the conjunction, and a
property, and asserts that the property holds of every atom in the sum, as in (23).
As a result, the vP in (21) expresses the proposition that John visited both the North
End and New York. Onlystrong presupposes this proposition, capturing (20a).
(23) JDK = λx.λ f〈e,st〉.λw.∀y≤ATOM x[ f (y)(w)]
Following Katzir 2007, we assume that alternatives are computed as syntactic objects,
which result from replacing the focused element in the prejacent with other elements
of equal or lesser structural complexity. The alternatives for only’s prejacent in (21)
thus express the propositions in (24). Each proposition entailing φS is excluded in
the assertive component, and (20b) is thus derived, as well.
(24) ALT = {φNE ,φNY ,φS,φNE⊕NY ,φNY⊕S,φNE⊕S}
A problem arises, however, if the LF in (21) ceded to the vF&I-style LF in (25),
with EXC triggering just an existential presupposition.
(25) [TP NEG [vP [EXC [the North End and New York]] λ1 John visited t1]]
First, some housekeeping is in order. In order to yield a reasonable assertion with
a sum argument, EXC is redefined as (26), in terms of the overlap relation: EXC
combines with an entity x and asserts that no entity non-overlapping with x is an f
(two entities are non-overlapping just in case they have no common part).2
2 Given (6), (25) should presuppose that J. visited somewhere and assert that he visited no place
non-identical to the sum NE⊕NY. Switzerland is one such place, so ¬φS follows, but both NE and NY
are also non-identical to NE⊕NY, so ¬φNE and ¬φNY follow, too, contradicting the presupposition.
Gajewski (2008) and Hirsch (2016) independently analyzed exceptives with but in terms of overlap,
and vF&I suggest such a refinement to EXC, too.
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(26) JEXCK = λxe.λ f〈e,st〉.λw : ∃y[ f (y)(w)].∃z[¬Overlap(z,x)∧ f (z)(w)]
Now, the vP in (25) asserts that John visited some entity non-overlapping with the
sum of the North End and New York, i.e. Switzerland, and that is negated to derive
(20b). The move to vF&I’s analysis impacts the presupposition: the vP presupposes
that John visited somewhere, which projects over negation, yielding (27a).
(27) a. P: φNY ∨φNY ∨φS b. A: ¬φS
The presupposition is overly weak. It does not on its own capture (20a), nor does
(20a) derive in combination with the assertion. Combined together, (27a) and (27b)
results in the disjunctive inference that John visited the North End or New York—not
the conjunctive inference that he visited both.
vF&I recognize the issue (see their footnote 22) and suggest that the derived
disjunctive inference may be pragmatically strengthened to yield the conjunctive
inference as an implicature. However, the conjunctive inference does not exhibit
the characteristic properties of implicatures: specifically, whereas implicatures are
generally defeasible, the conjunctive inference is not, as (28) shows.
(28) John only visited the NE and NY. #In fact, he just visited the North End.
We conclude that (20a) must be derived in the semantics and that the existential
presupposition analysis thus under-generates the inference.
4.2 Negation (neg > only )
In (29), only occurs in the scope of negation, resulting in two inferences: that John
visited the North End, and that he additionally visited somewhere else.
(29) John didn’t only visit [the North End]F .
(30) a. φNE b. φNY ∨φS
With onlystrong, both inferences are captured. In (31), onlystrong triggers the
prejacent presupposition that John visited the North End, and that projects over
negation, deriving (30a). (30b) derives from the assertion. Onlystrong asserts locally
at vP2 that John did not visit New York or Switzerland and, in turn, negation derives
the assertion that he did visit one or both places.
(31) [TP not [vP2 onlystrong [vP1 John visited [the North End]F ]]]
An existential analysis does not match the prediction. vF&I would assign (29)
the LF in (32). The top negation in (32) is the one separate from only. Beneath that
negation, only contributes its own negation, along with its exceptive component. The
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two negations cancel one another, resulting in the LF in (31) being equivalent to its
underlined subconstituent, with no negation head at all.
(32) [TP not [vP [NEG [[EXC the North End] [λ1 John visited t1]]]]]
Given vF&I’s lexical entry for EXC, the underlined constituent in (32) has the
presupposition and assertion in (33a) and (33b), respectively.
(33) a. P: φNE ∨φNY ∨φS b. A: φNY ∨φS
Because (33b) asymmetrically entails (33a), the amalgam of the presupposition and
assertion is equivalent to (33b), and the predicted inference is just that John visited
somewhere other than the North End, leaving (30a) unaccounted for. The analysis
again goes too far in bleeding prejacent inferences.
4.3 More negation (only < neg)
Consider now (34) where only occurs with negation in its scope. Here, there is an
observed inference that John didn’t visit the North End, as in (35a), in addition to
the further inference that he did visit everywhere else, as in (35b).
(34) John only didn’t visit [the North End]F .
(35) a. ¬φNE b. φNY ∧φS
Again, onlystrong delivers the right result. The prejacent presupposition is (35a).
On the assertive dimension, only operates over negative alternatives, expressing
¬φNE ,¬φNY , and ¬φS. The latter two are excludable, deriving (35b).
(36) [TP2 onlystrong [TP1 not [vP John visited [the North End]F ]]]
This time, vF&I’s analysis does furnish a possible LF which yields the observed
reading, as well. That LF is (37), where the negative and exceptive components of
only both take scope above the external negation.
(37) [TP2 NEG [TP1 [EXC the North End] λ1 [not [vP John visited t1]]]]
EXC triggers the existential presupposition that there is some place that John did not
visit, as in (38a). For assertion, TP1 says that there is some place other than the North
End that John did not visit. The higher negation thus outputs (38b). Presupposition
and assertion together derive the conjunction of (35a) and (35b).
(38) a. P: ¬φNE ∨¬φNY ∨¬φS b. A: ¬(¬φNY ∨¬φS)⇔ φNY ∧φS
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Still, a complication arises. Because EXC is covert and able to take scope at
different sites, vF&I predict an ambiguity in (34). In addition to (37), the LF in (39)
should be available too, where the EXCP scopes beneath the lowest negation. Like
in (32) above, two negations are adjacent in the structure and cancel one another.
As such, presupposition and assertion together convey that John visited somewhere
other than the North End—and that fails to entail either (35a) or (35b).
(39) [TP2 NEG [TP1 not [vP [EXC the North End] λ1 John visited t1]]]
(40) a. P: φNE ∨φNY ∨φS b. A: φNY ∨φS
vF&I’s analysis, then, runs into challenges with both not > only and only > not.
The problem has a different character in the two cases, however. With not > only,
one LF is predicted, and it yields a too weak reading. With only > neg, two LFs are
predicted, one of which yields the target reading, and the other of which yields a too
weak reading. The problem with not > only is one of under-generation, while the
problem with only > not is one of over-generation.
Over-generation is in general less severe, since it can in principle be resolved by
introducing extra constraints. It is unclear, though, what would block (39). First,
(39) has the same skeleton as the one that vF&I propose for their core example:
(41) [TP NEG [vP2 have to [vP1 [EXC the North End] λ1 you go to t1]]]
In each case, the negation from only scopes at the site where only is overtly realized,
while EXC scopes below some intervening operator (a modal in (41), the sentential
negation separate from only in (39)). Since (41) is vF&I’s central contribution, they
commit to that basic configuration being well-formed.
To block (39), there would have to be some constraint specifically penalizing
intervening negation. One possibility is that EXC is an NPI and is only licensed
when the global environment in which EXC occurs is downward monotonic. In (39)
the lower negation does create a downward monotonic environment locally, but the
higher negation cancels it. If EXC requires global downward monotonicity, then
EXC would be anti-licensed in (39). Yet, it would not be viable to impose such a
strong condition on EXC. Consider example (42a), where only is grammatical in
the antecedent of a conditional. If only decomposes into negation and an exceptive,
(42a) would have the LF in (42b). Again, NEG creates a downward monotonic
environment, but the global environment is not downward monotonic.
(42) a. If John only visited [the NE]F , he will complain about the tourists.
b. [If [NEG [EXC the NE] λ1 John visited t1]] [he will complain . . . ]
Hence, we will take the over-generation problem seriously as another reason to
question vF&I’s semantic revision of only.
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4.4 Taking stock
We have a paradox. On the one hand, for vF&I’s example, only must decompose
and carry a weak existential presupposition. On the other hand, decomposition is
difficult to maintain (Section 3), and a strong prejacent presupposition is necessary
in other data (Section 4). Our aim here is to resolve the paradox.
5 Proposal: Strong only, external weakener
We take the results of Sections 3 and 4 to reveal that only is simplex and strong,
as in (1). In this section, we return to vF&I’s example, and reconcile the observed
possibility inference with strong only. Our approach will yield the same meaning
components as vF&I’s, but through importantly different compositional means.
Along the way, our analysis will further derive the sufficiency intuition that the North
End is an easy place to get good cheese.
5.1 Weakening separate from only
We propose that a covert weakening operator, AT LEAST, is optionally inserted into
only’s scope. vF&I’s example has the LF in (43):3
(43) [TP onlystrong [vP2 have to [vP1 AT LEAST [you visit [the North End]F ]]]
Based on Crnic˘ 2011—which proposed that AT LEAST is available in the scope of
even—we put forward the lexical entry in (44). AT LEAST is a scalar focus operator.
It requires that the focus alternatives in ALT be partially or completely ordered on a
contextual scale (≤), presupposes that its prejacent (p) is lowest-ranked, and asserts
that some alternative ranked at least as high as p is true, i.e. that either p or some
higher-ranked alternative is true, thus weakening p.
(44) JAT LEASTKALT≤ =
λ p : ∀p′ ∈ALT[p′ 6= p→ p′ > p]. λw. ∃p′′ ∈ALT[p′′ ≥ p∧ p′′(w)]
The existential assertion will help derive the possibility inference in vF&I’s example,
and sufficiency will follow from the scalar presupposition.
In (43), AT LEAST operates over alternatives expressing φNE , φNY , and φS, which
are naturally ordered as in (45). The more effort you exert on average at φ -worlds,
3 Beaver & Clark 2008 argue that only is scalar and that only (p) presupposes that p or a higher ranked
proposition is true, thus making an ‘at least’ component part of only (see also Beaver & Coppock
2014.) We defer discussion of this proposal (see Alonso-Ovalle & Hirsch 2018) and simply note that
in the vF&I example the ‘at least’ component needs to be triggered under only, as discussed below.
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the higher φ is ranked. Assuming we start from Boston, it takes the least effort to go
to the North End of town, while New York and Switzerland are more effortful.
(45) φNE < φNY < φS
The prejacent of AT LEAST in (43) is φNE , which the scalar presupposition requires
to be lowest-ranked, as in (46). The presupposition is satisfied, given (45).
(46) P: ∀p′ ∈ALT[p′ 6=φNE → p′ >φNE] (scalar Ps)
vP1 then asserts that you go somewhere at least as effortful as the North End—or,
more simply, that you go somewhere. In turn, the modal derives as the assertion of
vP2 that in each cheese-world you go somewhere.4 Onlystrong takes that proposition
as its prejacent, which is globally presupposed, as shown in (47).
(47) P:  [JAT LEASTKALT≤(φNE)] = (φNE ∨φNY ∨φS) (prejacent Ps)
To determine what onlystrong asserts, consider the alternatives that it ranges over. In
the LF in (43), only and AT LEAST both associate with the object DP, but operate over
different alternatives. As noted earlier, we assume that alternatives are constructed
as syntactic objects. Only, we propose, operates over the alternatives in (48), each
containing AT LEAST. Because AT LEAST is focus-sensitive, F-marking must be
retained in the alternatives to identify its associate.5
(48) a. [have [AT LEAST [ you visit [the North End]F ]]] (φNE ∨φNY ∨φS)
b. [have [AT LEAST [ you visit [New York]F ]]] (φNY ∨φS)
c. [have [AT LEAST [ you visit [Switzerland]F ]]] φS
Each structural alternative expresses the proposition at the end of its line above.
While (48a) is equivalent to the prejacent of only, (48b) and (48c) are both stronger.
Only will thus negate the latter two, deriving as the assertion at TP that you do not
go to either New York or Switzerland at all cheese-worlds, as in (49).6
4 In general, presuppositions project universally from the scope of a universal: if p presupposes p′,JhaveK (p) presupposes that p′ holds at all worlds in the domain of quantification of the modal. One
would then expect TP2 to presuppose that φNE is lowest-ranked in ALT at all cheese-worlds. But
the scalar presupposition projects over the modal. Note, however, that this presupposition is world
independent and hence either true at all worlds (if φNE is lowest ranked), or false at all worlds (if φNE
is higher). If (44) is defined, this presupposition must be true at the evaluation world.
5 For reasons of space, we will omit syntactic labels from LFs when we don’t need to refer to them.
6 AT LEAST in the alternatives should trigger a scalar presupposition: in (48b), that φNY is lower-ranked
than φNE or φS, and in (48c), that φS is lowest-ranked. If either presupposition were to project
globally, presupposition failure would ensue. We must, therefore, commit to the scalar presupposition
not obligatorily projecting out of the focus alternatives (see also Crnic˘ 2011).
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(49) A: ¬(φNY ∨φS)∧¬φS (⇔¬(φNY ∨φS))
Just like vF&I’s analysis, our proposal derives the target possibility inference, ♦φNE .
(47) says that at each cheese-world you go somewhere, and (49) that you don’t
go to New York or Switzerland at all cheese-worlds. It thus follows that, at some
cheese-worlds, you go to the North End. Moreover, the scalar presupposition derives
sufficiency: given an effort-based scale, the scalar presupposition requires that the
prejacent of AT LEAST name the easiest place to go. The counterpart to vF&I’s
example in (50) is deviant, since φSW is highest ranked by effort, not lowest.
(50) a. #To get good cheese, you only have to go Switzerland.
b. [onlystrong [have [AT LEAST [you visit [Switzerland]F ]]]
5.2 Comparison with vF&I
In deriving (47) and (49), our proposal achieves the same result as vF&I’s, but
through different means. To illustrate, directly compare the LFs.
(51) a. [NEG [have [[EXC the North End] λ1 [you visit t1]]]]
b. [onlystrong [have [AT LEAST [you visit [the North End]F ]]]]
In both cases the modal is sandwiched between two operators, and the operator below
the modal makes an existential contribution. In vF&I’s analysis, EXC introduces
the presupposition that you visit somewhere, which projects universally through
the modal, delivering (47) as a global presupposition. In our analysis, AT LEAST
asserts that you visit somewhere, the modal operates on that assertion, and strong
only converts it to presupposition. As regards assertion, for vF&I, EXC introduces
the assertion that you visited somewhere other than the North End, and the modal
and negation operate on that proposition to yield (49). For us, (49) results from only
negating alternatives containing AT LEAST.
Crucially, our proposal differs from vF&I’s in two ways: (i) only is simplex, and
(ii) it triggers a ‘strong’ prejacent presupposition. Because, under our proposal, only
is simplex, the challenge for decomposition in Section 3 is neutralized. Moreover,
since weakening is outsourced away from only, we do not necessarily except to see
weakening in all cases where only is present. Weakening crucially depends on the
presence of AT LEAST, and there might be cases where AT LEAST is not available.
We discuss next some cases where we expect AT LEAST not to be available.
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6 Variable weakening = variable AT LEAST
Recall that vF&I’s proposal under-generates the prejacent inferences in (52a) and
(52b), and that, while it can derive the prejacent inference in (52c), it also over-
generates an unattested weak interpretation for that sentence.
(52) a. John only visited the North End and New York. ( φNE ∧φNY )
b. John didn’t only visit the North End. ( φNE)
c. John only didn’t visit the North End. ( ¬φNE) / ( φNY ∨φS)
Our proposal immediately resolves the under-generation problems. Since weak-
ening is not inherent to only, but outsourced to a separate optional operator, strong
readings are always available. As discussed in Section 4, the target readings are
captured by the LFs in (53), which contain strong only but no AT LEAST.
(53) a. [onlystrong [John visited the North End and New York]]
b. [not [onlystrong [John visited the North End]]]
c. [onlystrong [not [John visited the North End]]]
Still, the possibility of over-generation does remain. Why aren’t parses with AT
LEAST available, as well? In the following, we move systematically through each
case in (52), and conjecture that AT LEAST is blocked for pragmatic reasons.
6.1 Plurals
We believe that AT LEAST is blocked in (52a) because its scalar presupposition is
difficult or impossible to satisfy. Consider the LF in (54).
(54) [only [AT LEAST [John visited [the North End and New York]F ]]]
In (54), AT LEAST operates over the alternatives in (55). Since the underlined
alternatives are logically stronger than the others, one natural way to construct a
scale is based on entailment, as in (56). With that, however, the scalar presupposition
of AT LEAST would fail, since its prejacent (φNE⊕NY ) is ranked above the weaker
individual conjuncts (φNE , φNY ).
(55) {φNE ,φNY ,φS,φNE⊕NY ,φNE⊕S,φNY⊕S}
(56) φNE ,φNY ,φS<φNE⊕NY ,φNE⊕S,φNY⊕S
One could imagine different rankings where φNE would be lowest-ranked, but we
conjecture that a scalar operator such as AT LEAST requires ranking to positively
correlate with logical strength, as in (57).
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(57) A well-formed scale is such that ∀p, p′[p⊂ p′→ p> p′].
The LF in (54), then, must lead to presupposition failure. At the same time, AT LEAST
should be allowed in vF&I’s example, where φNE , the prejacent of AT LEAST, has
no weaker alternative. Indeed, the ranking of singular alternatives that we assumed
(φNE < φNY < φS) straightforwardly abides by (57), since all of the alternatives are
logically independent of one another. The conjecture further predicts that AT LEAST
should become unavailable in vF&I’s configuration if a conjunction is introduced.
The deviance of (58) under a sufficiency reading suggests that this is so.
(58) #To get good cheese, you only have to go to (both) the NE and NY.
6.2 Negation: only > not
In addressing negation, it will most expedient to start with the case in (52c), where
only scopes over negation. There are two positions where AT LEAST could occur in
the scope of only in this case: above negation, as in (59a), or under negation, as in
(59b). We’ll discuss both possibilities.
(59) a. LF1: [onlystrong [AT LEAST [not [John went to [the North End]F ]]]]
b. LF2: [only [not [AT LEAST [John visit [the North End]F ]]]]
In LF1, AT LEAST operates over alternatives expressing the negative propositions
¬φNE , ¬φNY , and ¬φS. For its scalar presupposition to be met, ¬φNE must be
lowest-ranked, as in (60). That ranking inversely correlates with the average effort
exerted at φ -worlds, since, on average, more effort is exerted at ¬φNE-worlds than at
¬φNY -worlds and, in turn, at ¬φS-worlds.
(60) ¬φNE < ¬φNY < ¬φS
Suppose the ranking in (60) could be constructed, and that the scalar presuppo-
sition is thus satisfiable.7 Then, LF1 should be viable. There is no need to block
this LF, though, since it yields an unproblematic interpretation. The presupposed
prejacent of only says that there is somewhere that John didn’t go, as in (61a).
Negating alternatives derives (61b). Combined, it follows that John didn’t go to the
7 There is evidence that an inverse effort-based ranking is difficult to construct. If the inverse ranking
of positive alternatives in (ii) were available, (i) would be felicitous. In (ii), φS is lowest ranked, and
(i) would presuppose that going to Switzerland is the hardest way to get good cheese. By extension,
the ranking in (60) might be difficult too, in so far as it requires an ordering inversely proportional to
effort. If (60) is unavailable, failure of the scalar presupposition would block insertion of AT LEAST.
(i) # To get good cheese, you only have to go to Switzerland. (ii) φS < φNY < φNE
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North End, but went everywhere else, as observed in (52c).
(61) a. P: ¬φNE ∨¬φNY ∨¬φS
b. A: ¬JAT LEASTK(¬φNY )∧¬JAT LEASTK(¬φS) (⇔ φNY ∧φS)
We now turn to LF2. When AT LEAST is below negation, it operates over positive
singular alternatives, and its scalar presupposition is satisfied with the familiar
effort-based ranking. A pathology does arise, however. Locally, AT LEAST weakens
the complement of negation. Since negation is an entailment reversing operator,
however, the overall prejacent of only is strengthened by the presence of AT LEAST.
As shown in (62), the presupposed prejacent conveys that John went nowhere.
(62) P: ¬JAT LEASTKALT≤(φNE) (⇔¬φNE ∧¬φNY ∧¬φS)
As a result, all of the alternatives only sees other than the prejacent—in (63)—are
weaker than the prejacent. Hence the problem: because only selectively negates non-
weaker alternatives, there are no excludable alternatives, and the assertive component
of only is trivialized. In particular, the assertion is a tautology: only says that every
non-weaker alternative is false, and that is trivially true when there are none.
(63) a. ¬JAT LEASTKALT≤(φNE)⇔¬φNE ∧¬φNY ∧¬φS
b. ¬JAT LEASTKALT≤(φNY )⇔¬φNY ∧¬φS
c. ¬JAT LEASTKALT≤(φS)⇔¬φS
We propose that LF2 is not detected precisely because its assertion is trivial. This
fits with a broad, well-established pattern. It has been proposed that trivial meanings
(due to contradiction) arise with strong determiners in existential there constructions
(Barwise & Cooper 1981), exceptive but with certain quantifiers such as existentials
(von Fintel 1993); comparative quantifiers in the scope of only (Fox & Hackl 2006);
and negative islands (Fox & Hackl 2006); among other cases. In each case, triviality
leads to ungrammaticality (for a generalization, see Gajewski 2002).
In sum, when only scopes over negation, there are two possible LFs with AT
LEAST and neither raises an over-generation worry. LF1 yields a reasonable inter-
pretation (or is unavailable due to its scalar component) and LF2 is blocked.
6.3 More negation: not > only
The final case to consider is (52b), where negation scopes over only. A possible LF
with AT LEAST in the scope of only is (64), interpreted as (65a) and (65b).
(64) [not [only [AT LEAST [John visited [the North End]F ]]]]
(65) a. P: φNE ∨φNY ∨φS
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b. A: ¬(¬JAT LEASTKALT≤(φNY )∧¬JAT LEASTKALT≤(φS))(⇔ φNY ∨φS)
As we have seen before, when discussing the interpretation that vF&I predict
for (52b), the amalgam of presupposition and assertion in (65) is equivalent to the
assertion in (65b). This meaning is not attested: (52b) conveys that John went to the
North End, but neither the presupposition, nor the amalgam of presupposition and
assertion, derive this inference. The predicted meaning is not pathological, this time,
though. Why is it blocked, then?
We suspect that (65) is blocked due to a competition with the parse without AT
LEAST, which is repeated in (66), together with its predicted interpretation in (67).
(66) [not [only [John visited [the North End]F ]]]
(67) a. P: φNE b. A: ¬(¬φNY ∧¬φS)(⇔ φNY ∨φS)
Despite differences in presupposition, there is a crucial similarity between the
meanings in (65) and (67): in both cases, the assertion is identical. We conjecture
that the parse without AT LEAST is preferred because it is structurally simpler, and
that the parse with AT LEAST is available only when its assertion differs from that of
the simpler parse in some appropriate way.
Although AT LEAST locally weakens its prejacent, we conjecture that AT LEAST
must not lead to a weaker global assertion.8 There are different ways of formulating
the constraint consistent with the data. For concreteness, we put forward (68),
which invokes von Fintel’ s (1999) notion of Strawson entailment in order to isolate
assertion—as defined in (68), Strawson entailment evaluates entailment, assuming
that all presuppositions are met.
(68) Let LF1 be of the form [. . . AT LEAST [X] . . . ].
Let LF2 be of the form [. . . [X] . . . ]
(where LF2 replaces AT LEAST [X] in LF1 with [X].)
LF1 is disallowed (or dispreferred) if JLF2K Strawson entails JLF1K.
(69) If α and β are of type 〈s, t〉, α Strawson entails β iff
for all w s.t. w ∈ dom(α) and w ∈ dom(β ), α(w)→ β (w).
The constraint in (68) blocks AT LEAST in cases where its absence results in an
equivalent global assertion, as is the case in (64). The LF in (64) should be blocked,
given (68), since its competitor in (66) Strawson entails it (in fact, in this case, both
LFs are Strawson equivalent.)
The anti-weakening conjecture rightly allows AT LEAST in vF&I’s example.
While AT LEAST weakens presupposition, it does strengthen the global assertion
in that case. The parse is repeated in (70a), along with a competitor without AT
8 We thank Gennaro Chierchia for helpful discussion of this idea.
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LEAST. Whereas the assertion in (70a) requires that neither φNY nor φS hold at some
cheese-worlds, that in (70b) is compatible with all cheese-worlds being either φNY -
or φNE-worlds. (70a) Strawson entails (70b) (and not vice versa.)
(70) a. [only [have [AT LEAST [John visited [the North End]F ]]]
 A: ¬(φNY ∨ φS)
b. [only [have [John visited [the North End]F ]]]
 A: ¬(φNY ) ∧ ¬(φS)
In addition to blocking (64), note that the anti-weakening conjecture also blocks
both LF1 and LF2 from the preceding section. The assertion of LF1, repeated as
(71a), is equivalent to that of the AT LEAST free competitor in (71b). Since the
competitor Strawson entails LF1, LF1 is blocked.
(71) a. [only [AT LEAST [not [John visited [the North End]F ]]]] (LF1)
 A: ¬JAT LEASTK(¬φNY )∧¬JAT LEASTK(¬φS) (⇔ φNY ∧φS )
b. [only [not [John visited [the North End]F ]]]
 A: ¬¬φNY ∧¬¬φS (⇔ φNY ∧φS)
The competition involving LF2 is shown in (72). Granting presuppositions, the truth
of any proposition trivially guarantees the truth of a tautology, since the tautology is
always true. Hence, the competitor in (72b) necessarily Strawson Entails tautologous
LF2, which is accordingly blocked.
(72) a. [only [not [AT LEAST [John visited [the North End]F ]]]] (LF2)
 A: > (tautology)
b. [only [not [John visited [the North End]F ]]]
 A: ¬¬φNY ∧¬¬φS (⇔ φNY ∧φS)
Neither result argues for the conjecture in (64), but neither result is unwelcome
either. While LF1 is unproblematic, blocking it is equally unproblematic: the LF
without AT LEAST can generate the observed interpretation on its own. LF2 was
already blocked by general constraints against triviality, and the competition logic
from the anti-weakening conjecture converges with those general constraints.
In sum, the anti-weakening conjecture is consistent with the data. It is also
notably reminiscent of constraints on other operators. In particular, Chierchia et al.
(2012) observe that the covert strengthener, EXH, is not licensed in environments
where it would lead to a weaker overall assertion, such as the scope of negation.
Perhaps, in general, parses with a covert operator are allowed over a simpler parse
without the operator only if they have a non-weaker assertion.
Overall, we have suggested that AT LEAST is blocked with plurals and negation
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for pragmatic reasons. In particular, the scalar presupposition of AT LEAST is difficult
to satisfy with plurals, and a global anti-weakening requirement blocks AT LEAST
with negation (convergent with other constraints, in certain cases). In this way,
over-generation concerns are addressed.9
7 Conclusion
We started with vF&I’s observation that a necessity modal in the scope of only can
result in a global possibility inference, and argued against vF&I’s proposal that the
source of weakening is only itself.
In our analysis, only is a simplex adverbial, which triggers a strong prejacent
presupposition, and weakening is outsourced to a separate covert operator, AT LEAST,
which may take scope between only and the modal. Crucially, AT LEAST is optional,
and not always available: with plurals and negation, AT LEAST is pragmatically
blocked, and prejacent inferences emerge.
To conclude, we flag two avenues for future investigation. First, our discussion
in Section 6 focused on restricting the distribution of AT LEAST within the scope of
only—the environment where we argued AT LEAST does occur in vF&I’s example.
We leave it to future work to study the distribution of AT LEAST in other environ-
ments. At present we are uncertain whether AT LEAST is ever attested outside the
scope of another focus operator.
Second, weakening is not limited to constructions with overt only, but observed
in certain other exhaustive focus constructions, as well. As noted by Vincent Homer
and Bernhard Schwarz (p.c.), the copular construction in (73) again conveys that
going to the North End is just one (easy) way of getting good cheese (see Homer (to
appear)).
(73) To get good cheese, all you have to do is go to the North End.
Weakening in the absence of only is broadly supportive of our approach. Still, we
leave it as a matter for future research to develop a full compositional analysis of
(73) with AT LEAST, and to study the distribution of weakening in exhaustive copular
constructions more generally.
9 Certain modals do not exhibit weakening in vF&I’s configuration: (i), for instance, conveys the
universal claim that in all want-worlds you go to the NE. This is predicted: in (i) AT LEAST would
not lead to weakening, because want is NEG-raising. (ii) should presuppose that you want to go
somewhere, and assert (iiia), strengthened to (iiib). This, together with presupposition, derives the
universal claim. We leave further study of which modals exhibit weakening to future work.
(i) I only want to go to the North End. (ii) [only [want [AT LEAST [I go to the NE]]]]
(iii) a. ¬(φNY ∨φS) b. (¬(φNY ∨φS))⇔(¬φNY ∧¬φS)
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